Contra Willenborg, the possibility of the antecedent of (EP) does not entail Theism and Arguments from Evil that employ (EP) not only (a) provide reason to suppose Atheism is true, but also (b) provide the required epistemic justification for the rejection of the key premise of the Modal Ontological Argument. I argue that Willenborg is incorrect with respect to the first horn. On the other hand, if the antecedent of (EP) is impossible then (EP) cannot be epistemically justified. Willenborg argues that if the antecedent of (EP) is possible it entails Theism by the Modal Ontological Argument. Willenborg argues that there is a conditional premise-(EP)-that is essential to any Argument from Evil and which ensures that no such argument can meet both conditions (i) and (ii). According to Willenborg, the two conditions that must be met are the following: (i) the argument must lower the probability of Theism being true beyond an acceptable epistemic threshold, and (ii) the argument must not employ any premises that entail the truth of Theism. Michael Willenborg argues that no Argument from Evil can meet two necessary conditions for a successful piece of atheology.
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